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Abstract
By distinguishing between producible and nonproducible public goods, we are able
to propose a general equilibrium model with externalities that distinguishes between
and encompasses both the Starrett [1972] and Boyd and Conley [1997] type external
eﬀects. We show that while nonconvexities remain fundamental whenever the Starrett
type external eﬀects are present, these are not caused by the type discussed in Boyd
and Conley. Secondly, we ﬁnd that the notion of a “public competitive equilibrium”
for public goods found in Foley [1967, 1970] allows a decentralized mechanism, based
on both price and quantity signals, for economies with externalities, which is able
to restore the equivalence between equilibrium and eﬃciency even in the presence of
nonconvexities. This is in contrast to equilibrium notions based purely on price signals
such as the Pigouvian taxes.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: D62, D50, H41.
Keywords: externalities, fundamental nonconvexities, Clarke’s normal and tangent
cones, public goods.
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Externalities and Fundamental Nonconvexities:
A Reconciliation of Views and Implications for Decentralization
by
Sushama Murty
1. Introduction
Arrow [1970] perceived the market failure associated with externalities as a prob-
lem of incomplete markets. He showed that the equivalence between a competitive
equilibrium and a Pareto optimum can be restored if markets for external eﬀects can
be created. However, employing Arrow’s framework, where the commodity space is ex-
tended to include the rights to generate externalities as additional commodities, Starrett
[1972] demonstrated that the presence of detrimental production externalities creates
fundamental nonconvexities in the technology sets of ﬁrms. He considers an example
where increases in the level of an externality reduces the maximum output a ﬁrm can
produce, given the levels of all inputs. But, the maximum output of the ﬁrm, for any
given level of inputs, is assumed never to fall below zero, even in the face of an un-
limited amount of the externality (the ﬁrm always has the option of shutting down
production). This implies that the frontier of the technology is either asymptotic to
the axis reserved for the externality or coincides with it after a critical level of the
externality, where the maximum output has fallen to zero, has been reached. As is well
known, when the convexity assumption fails, the existence of a competitive equilibrium
becomes questionable.1
A question then arises about the possibility of existence of some other alternative
decentralized mechanism (for a deﬁnition, see the footnote below) that will, in the pres-
ence of externalities, ensure the equivalence between the underlying equilibrium concept
and Pareto optimality.2 A popular candidate is the one associated with Pigovian taxes,
1 In this context, the nonconvexity implies that, at all positive prices of a right to generate a detri-
mental externality, there exists no solution to the proﬁt maximization of a ﬁrm facing the detrimental
externality for, if the (personalized) price that a ﬁrm receives from the generator of an externality
is positive, then shutting down production and supplying an arbitrarily large positive amount of the
externality rights to the generator is both technologically feasible and proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. On the
other hand, a non-positive price creates an excess demand for externality rights.
2 Roughly, employing the terminology of Calsamiglia [1977], a mechanism is decentralized if the
response of an agent to messages or signals received depends only on that agent’s characteristics. This
reﬂects the initial dispersion of knowledge of the the economic environment, so that “each agent knows
only his component of the environment” and “all the information concerning the rest of the agents has
to be come via formal messages.”
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attributable to Pigou [1932] and Baumol [1972]. This can be interpreted as a decentral-
ized mechanism where the government is also an economic agent, whose responses (the
determination of the Pigovian taxes on the externality generators and the redistribution
of tax revenue) depend on the information (the shadow prices) communicated to it by
the agents aﬀected by the externalities. As has been well documented, an equilibrium
with Pigouvian taxes is compatible with nonconvex technology sets of the ﬁrms facing
detrimental externalities, so long as the technologies of these ﬁrms are convex in the
appropriate subspaces.3 However, the problem with the Pigovian tax mechanism is
that, while any Pareto optimum can be decentralized as a Pigovian tax equilibrium,
the reverse is not true. Baumol and Bradford [1972] showed that, if the detrimental
eﬀects of externalities on victim ﬁrms are suﬃciently large, the aggregate technology
set of the economy could well be nonconvex. In such a nonconvex economy, although
the ﬁrst order conditions of Pareto optimality would hold at a Pigovian tax equilibrium
determined by government chosen levels of Pigovian taxes, the second order conditions
for even a local Pareto optimum may fail. Thus, an arbitrary Pigovian tax equilibrium
may not be eﬃcient, unless, we restrict the class of economies to those where the exter-
nalities are weak enough to ensure convexity of the social transformation set, as is done
in Hurwicz [1999].4 In general, Hurwicz [1999] shows the impossibility of the existence
of ﬁnite-dimensional decentralized mechanisms that guarantee Pareto optimality in the
presence of externalities, for all economic environments (including nonconvex ones).5
More recently, however, Boyd and Conley [1997], henceforth referred to as BC,
and Conley and Smith [2002] have challenged the fundamentality of nonconvexities for
real economies with externalities. They argue that nonconvexities are fundamental to
the Arrow/Starrett framework because it does not seem to oﬀer a method of placing
reasonable bounds on the extent to which the victim ﬁrms can observe the externality
(sell externality rights to the generators). In real economies, BC argue, there are natural
limits to the extent to which externalities can be generated. For example, the capacity
of land, water, and air to absorb wastes and pollution is really not unlimited. According
to them, nonconvexities with externalities are no longer fundamental in a model that
treats the externality absorption capacity of the economy as a bounded resource, which
has diﬀerent qualitative values for diﬀerent agents. Thus, they propose a decentralized
3 See, e.g., Starrett, Baumol and Bradford [1972], and Hurwicz [1999].
4 A more general notion of a Pigou-Baumol equilibrium is formulated in Tulkens and Schoumaker
[1975]. This equilibrium concept (a Nash equilibrium) includes cases, where even the ﬁrst order condi-
tions of optimality may not hold at the the government chosen level of Pigovian taxes (disagreement
equilibria). The issue in this paper is to design a decentralizable resource allocation process, for convex
environments, that moves the economy from a disagreement equilibrium to a Pareto optimum through
a sequence of Pigou-Baumol equilibria obtained by adjusting the Pigou taxes.
5 Hurwicz shows this in a manner analogous to the case of increasing returns in Calsamiglia [1977].
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mechanism in the spirit of Coase [1960] for convex environments, where the endowment
of this capacity is bounded and distributed among agents who trade them.6 They prove
the equivalence between an equilibrium and a Pareto optimum.7
This paper aims to make two contributions. Firstly, we propose a general equi-
librium model with externalities, which distinguishes between and encompasses both
the Arrow/Starrett and BC type external eﬀects. The key to constructing the general
model lies in distinguishing between producible and nonproducible public goods. It
is the latter kind of goods that are the objects of concern in BC. In BC, they include
scarce economic resources such as land, air, water, etc., that provide a means of disposal
for producible public goods such as pollution and wastes. As BC argue, nonconvexity
is not fundamental to them. Arrow/Starrett’s concern, on the other hand, is with the
producible public goods. Unlike the nonproducible natural resources, when the mar-
kets for rights to generate producible public goods (such as emission of green house
gases) are created and these rights are traded, there may be net additions (or dele-
tions/abatement) to the already existing stocks (the endowments) in the economy. We
show that to the extent external eﬀects caused by producible public goods are prevalent
in the economy, Starrett type technological nonconvexities will remain fundamental.
Thus, we are once again confronted with Hurwicz’s negative result for nonconvex
economies. A second objective of this paper, thus, is to propose a decentralized mecha-
nism that permits autonomy of decision making based on both current market price and
quantity signals, incorporates (to some extent) the Coasian component in the equilib-
rium proposed by BC, and restores the equivalence between equilibrium and eﬃciency
even in the presence of nonconvexities. This equilibrium concept is motivated by the
notion of a “public competitive equilibrium” discussed in Foley [1967, 1970]. In Fo-
ley’s mechanism, the demand for public goods is collectively determined and ﬁnanced
(at current market prices) by a (decentralized) unanimity rule, while their supply is
determined by proﬁt maximization at prevailing market prices.
The remaining paper is arranged as follows. In section 2, we set up a general
equilibrium model of externalities. Section 3 derives the Arrow/Starrett model and
the BC model as special cases of the general model and discusses the nonconvexities
and market failures associated with certain producible public goods. This is done by
providing axioms that distinguish between public goods that are by-products (such as
pollution) and joint-products (such as national defense) of production. We show that,
6 For a collection of these agents (the consumers in BC model), this capacity may well be a public
good (i.e., a good of collective consumption), so that the underlying equilibrium has the Lindahl
property.
7 Conley and Smith also prove the existence of the Coasian equilibrium in a more general economy
that includes consumption externalities as well. See also Hurwicz [1995] and Varian [1995].
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abstracting from issues such as thin markets and free riding, markets will typically fail
in the case of by-product public goods–both detrimental and beneﬁcial; while they could
be functional for the joint product public goods. In section 4, we deﬁne a collective
consumption equilibrium and prove its welfare properties. We conclude in section 5.
2. A General Model of Externalities.
There are two types of commodities in the economy. Firstly, there are ordinary
commodities possessing the rivalness property of private goods. K is the index set
for such commodities, which will be indexed by k. Then there are goods which are
jointly consumed (that is, having public good or non-rivalness property in consumption.)
We further classify the public goods into nonproducible and producible public goods.
Nonproducible public goods are those whose supply is ﬁxed by the availability of their
resources. Some imperfect examples of these goods include forest cover (at least in the
short run), a water body, etc. They will be will be indexed by l belonging to an index
set L. Producible public goods are those whose whose supply can be augmented by
production beyond their respective resource availability. M is the index set of these
producible public goods, which will be indexed by m. Later, we will also distinguish
between joint-product producible public goods (national defense is a classic example)
and by-product producible public goods (for example, pollution and nectar produced
in the apple blossoms of an orchard neighboring a bee-keeping farm).
There are three types of agents in the economy: (i) consumers, who are indexed
by h that belongs to an index set H, (ii) ﬁrms for which the goods in L and M are
public goods. These are indexed by i that belongs to an index set I, and (iii) ﬁrms for
which goods in L are standard inputs (having rivalness property: the total use by all
ﬁrms of these goods is the sum of individual uses) and which produce the goods in M .
These are indexed by j that belongs to an index set J .8
The endowment vector of ordinary commodities is denoted by ω and of nonpro-
ducible public goods is denoted by η + σ. The initial stock of producible public goods
is ξ. We assume that ω ∈ RK+ , η + σ ∈ RL+, and ξ ∈ RM+ .
For all i ∈ I, the technology of ﬁrm i is denoted by Y i ⊆ RK ×RL+×RM+ , and its
production vector is denoted by yi = 〈oi, ni, ei〉 ∈ RK ×RL+×RM+ . The net production
of ordinary commodities is oi ∈ RK . The consumption (use) of nonproducible public
8 Focusing on production externalities alone is not a restriction. The model can be generalized to in-
clude consumption externalities. Following the framework of Milleron (where he distinguishes between
outputs (+) and inputs (-) of public goods for every ﬁrm), we can also extend the model to include
bilateral (reciprocal) externalities, where ﬁrms can both generate and be victims to externalities. We
refrain from doing so here in order to keep the notation tractable and the exposition simple enough for
studying the qualitative distinction between being a consumer and being a producer of public goods.
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goods by i is denoted by ni ∈ RL+, and its consumption of producible public goods is
denoted by ei ∈ RM+ .
For all j ∈ J , the technology of ﬁrm j is denoted by Y j ⊆ RK ×RL−×RM and its
net output vector is denoted by yj = 〈oj , di, zj〉 ∈ RK×RL−×RM+ . The net production
of ordinary commodities is oj ∈ RK . The use by ﬁrm j of the nonproducible goods in
index set L is dj ∈ RL−. The net addition to the stock of producible public goods in the
economy by ﬁrm j is denoted by zj ∈ RM .
The consumption set of consumer h ∈ H is denoted by Xh ⊆ RK+L+M+ . A
consumption bundle is denoted by xh = 〈o˜h, n˜h, e˜h〉 ∈ RK+L+M+ , where o˜h is the gross
consumption of ordinary commodities by h and n˜h and e˜h are the consumption levels
of nonproducible and producible public goods, respectively, by h. The preferences are
representable by real valued utility function uh, for all h ∈ H.
An economy with above speciﬁcations will be represented by E = 〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i,
(Y j)j , ω, η + σ, ξ〉.
Deﬁnition: A feasible allocation of the economy E = 〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i, (Y j)j , ω, η +
σ, ξ〉 is a tuple 〈(xh)h, (yi)i, (yj)j〉 such that xh ∈ Xh for all h ∈ H, yi ∈ Y i for all i ∈ I,
yj ∈ Y j for all j ∈ J , and
∑
h
o˜h =
∑
i
oi +
∑
j
oj + ω,
n˜h =
∑
j
dj + η + σ, ∀h ∈ H,
ni =
∑
j
dj + η + σ, ∀i ∈ I,
e˜h =
∑
j
zj + ξ, ∀h ∈ H, and
ei =
∑
j
zj + ξ, ∀i ∈ I.
(2.1)
A reason for external eﬀects to arise in this economy is the inability of agents to
voluntarily choose the levels of their respective consumption or use of all commodities.
This will be true, for example, if in a market based economy, competitive markets for
all commodities did not exist. In the case of public goods, absence of external eﬀects
requires the existence of personalized markets, where each consumer or user of the good
trades alone with the generator(s) of the good. External eﬀects associated with public
goods will be the primary focus of this paper.9
9 Though the model proposed in this paper can easily be extended to encompass, also, externalities
created by absence of markets for goods having the rivalness feature.
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We now provide a private ownership structure for the endowments in this economy
that can sustain a market based institutional structure with public goods. We assume
that the endowment of all private goods is owned by the consumers in H. Let ω be
distributed as (ωh)h. The endowment of nonproducible public goods is divided between
those for whom they are public goods (ﬁrms in I and consumers in H) and those for
whom they are standard (rival) inputs (ﬁrms in J). Because they are public goods for
agents in H and I, we assume that each agent in H and I owns the same amount η of
such resources. The remaining amount σ is distributed between agents in J as (σj)j .
Lastly, we assume that each agent in H and I owns the same amount ξ of the initial
stock of producible public goods.
We deﬁne the restrictions of the technology sets to appropriate subspaces by em-
ploying the following notation: For all i ∈ I and ei ∈ RM+ , deﬁne P i(ei) :=
{〈oi, ni〉 ∈
RK × RL+
∣∣ 〈oi, ni, ei〉 ∈ Y i}. Likewise, we can deﬁne the correspondence P i(ni), and
for all j ∈ J , the correspondence, P j(oj , zj), and so on.
3. A Reconciliation of Approaches to General Equilibrium Externality Mod-
eling, Nonconvexities, and Market Failure.
3.1. The Boyd and Conley Model.
In the BC model the goods in L include environmental resources like air, water,
land, which provide a means of disposal for producible public goods in M such as
pollution. Goods in L have alternative uses for diﬀerent users. For agents in H and I
they are public goods, while for agents in J they are inputs for disposing of by-products
of production. Using these goods for certain purposes, crowds out their availability for
other purposes (for example, use of a waterbody for dumping wastes crowds out the
amount available for recreation or, as in BC, increase in the pollution content of the air
reduces the amount of clean air that is needed for drying clothes by a laundry.)
We argue that the BC model is a special case of (2.1), where consumers in H and
producers in I have zero values for the producible public goods in M themselves, but
they value the environmental resources in L in their clean state.10 If markets for goods
in L existed, then the opportunity cost of enjoying the environmental resources would
be the income foregone by not selling them to ﬁrms in J . An analogy may make it
clearer. Time endowment is usually assumed to be a nonproducible resource. Con-
sumers allocate it between leisure and labor. The wage rate reﬂects the opportunity
cost of enjoying leisure. Labor time can be used by ﬁrms to produce several diﬀer-
ent outputs for which consumers have diﬀerent intrinsic values, and hence, there are
10 This is captured in Assumption BC, below.
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diﬀerent markets associated with the output produced out of labor time. Consumers
buy these outputs at prices (which are distinctly diﬀerent from their wages) that reﬂect
their marginal valuation of these commodities. Similarly, a collectively owned piece
of land can be allocated to recreational use, dumping wastes, making buildings, etc.
The opportunity cost of its recreational use is the income foregone by not selling it
to ﬁrms that can use it as an input for dumping wastes or building houses, etc. Fur-
ther, the ﬁrms can use it to dump several diﬀerent types of wastes (e.g., biodegradable
and non-biodegradable wastes), each of which has its own intrinsic (negative) value for
consumers.
Assumption BC, below, implies that consumers’ preferences and technologies of
the producers in I are independent of the levels of the producible public goods in M .
We state Theorem BC without proof. It says that, under Assumption BC, we need
only consider the projection of economy E to the space of commodities in K and L to
identify all the feasible states of E. This is because, given Assumption BC, the amounts
of the producible public goods, produced by ﬁrms in J at any feasible state of such a
projected economy, are consistent with the (unprojected) consumers’ preferences and
technologies of the ﬁrms in I.11
Assumption BC (Zero Valuation of Goods in M .): For all h ∈ H if xh :=
〈o˜h, n˜h, e˜h〉 ∈ Xh, then xˆh := 〈o˜h, n˜h, ˆ˜eh〉 ∈ Xh and uh(xh) = uh(xˆh) for all ˆ˜eh ∈ RM+ .
For all i ∈ I and for all ei, eˆi ∈ RM+ , we have P i(ei) = P i(eˆi).
Theorem BC: Under Assumption BC, if (i) 〈〈o˜h, n˜h〉h, 〈oi, ni〉i, 〈oj , dj〉j〉 is such that
〈o˜h, n˜h〉, 〈oi, ni〉i, and 〈oj , dj〉j are in the projections of Xh, Y i and Y j to the space of
commodities in K and L for all h ∈ H, i ∈ I, and j ∈ J , (ii) the ﬁrst, second, and
the third conditions of (2.1) hold, and (iii) there exists a zj for all J ∈ J such that
〈oj , dj , zj〉 ∈ Y j, then 〈〈o˜h, n˜h,∑j zj + ξ〉h, 〈oi, ni,
∑
j z
j + ξ〉i, 〈oj , dj , zj〉j〉 is a feasible
state of E.
3.2. The Arrow/Starrett Model.
On the other hand, we claim that the Arrow/Starrett model is concerned primarily
with external eﬀects created by goods in M . We derive a variant of this model, a special
case of (2.1), where the goods in L are not of any intrinsic value to consumers in H and
ﬁrms in I, that is, changes in the consumption levels of these resources, do not aﬀect
the welfare or production possibilities of these agents (this is Assumption AS1), and the
external eﬀects (the producible public goods) comprise of observations by each consumer
in H and each ﬁrm in I of the ordinary commodities produced by all ﬁrms in J (these
11 Note, no problem is posed if the endowment of any good in L is unbounded.In a market economy,
in a general equilibrium, the price of that commodity will be zero.
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are, precisely, the Arrovian commodities). This implies that M = JK, and that, in an
institutional structure with complete markets, we would need JK(H + I) personalized
(artiﬁcial) markets for the public goods in M . This is reﬂected in Assumption AS2.
Assumption AS1 (Zero Intrinsic Valuation of Goods in L.): For all h ∈ H,
if xh := 〈o˜h, n˜h, e˜h〉 ∈ Xh, then xˆh := 〈o˜h, ˆ˜nh, e˜h〉 ∈ Xh and uh(xh) = uh(xˆh) for all
ˆ˜n
h ∈ RL+. For all i ∈ I and for all ni, nˆi ∈ RL+, we have P i(ni) = P i(nˆi).
Assumption AS2: |M | = JK and for all j ∈ J , if yj ∈ Y j then zj = 〈0K , . . . , 0K , oj ,
0K . . . , 0K〉 ∈ RM .
We state Theorem AS without proof. It says that, under Assumptions AS1 and
AS2, we need consider only the projection of the economy E to the space of commodities
in K and M , to identify all the feasible states of E. This is because, under Assumptions
AS1 and AS2, at any feasible state of such a projected economy, the amounts of the
nonproducible public goods available to consumers and ﬁrms in I, after the implied
usage by ﬁrms in J , are consistent with the (unprojected) consumers’ preferences and
technologies of the ﬁrms in I.
Theorem AS: Under Assumptions AS1 and AS2 if (i) 〈〈o˜h, e˜h〉h, 〈oi, ei〉i, 〈oj , zj〉j〉 is
such that 〈o˜h, e˜h〉, 〈oi, ei〉i, and 〈oj , zj〉j are in the projections of Xh, Y i and Y j to the
space of commodities in K and M for all h ∈ H, i ∈ I, and j ∈ J , (ii) the ﬁrst, fourth,
and the ﬁfth conditions of (2.1) hold, and (iii) there exists a dj for all j ∈ J such that
〈oj , dj , zj〉 ∈ Y j, then 〈〈o˜h,∑j dj + η + σ, e˜h, 〉h, 〈oi,
∑
j d
j + η + σ, ei〉i, 〈oj , dj , zj〉j〉 is
a feasible state of E.
3.3. Nonconvexities.
To the extent the set M of producible public goods is not empty, we show, below,
that the nonconvexities discussed in Starrett [1972] and Starrett and Zeckhauser [1974]
remain pertinent.
3.3.1. Technological Nonconvexities for Firms in I.
For the ﬁrms in I, we distinguish between detrimental and beneﬁcial producible
public goods. Intuitively, m ∈ M is detrimental (beneﬁcial) if increases in its level
contract (expand) the set of production possibilities of all other commodities.
Deﬁnition: The good m ∈ M is a detrimental (beneﬁcial) producible public good
for ﬁrm i ∈ I if P i(ei) ⊆ P i(e¯i) ∀ e¯i, ei ∈ RM+ such that e¯im < eim (e¯im > eim) and
e¯im′ = e
i
m′ ,∀m′ = 1, . . . ,M, with m′ = m, and Boundary (P i(ei)) ⊂ Boundary (P i(e¯i))
for some e¯i, ei ∈ RM+ such that e¯im < eim (e¯im > eim) and e¯im′ = eim′ ,∀ m′ = 1, . . . ,M,
with m′ = m.
We now present a set of assumptions regarding the technologies of ﬁrms in I.
Notable among these, is Assumption I2. This assumption, on the one hand, provides
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a general unboundedness condition on the technologies of ﬁrms in I in the direction of
goods in M and, on the other, is a generalization of Starrett’s view that the damage done
by detrimental producible public goods is ﬁnite: precisely, in his model, shutting down
production of ordinary commodities is an option available to the victim ﬁrm at every
level of the production externality observed. Thus, this is a compelling assumption on
the technologies of ﬁrms in I.
Assumption I1 (Convexity): Y i is convex.
Assumption I2:
⋂
ei∈RM+ P
i(ei) = ∅.
Assumption I3: P i(ei) is closed ∀ ei ∈ RM+ .
Assumption I4 (Detrimental Producible Public Good): m ∈M is a detrimental
producible public good for i ∈ I.
Assumption I5 (Beneﬁcial Producible Public Good): m ∈ M is a beneﬁcial
producible public good for i ∈ I.
Otani and Sicilian demonstrated the technological nonconvexities associated with
detrimental producible public goods by showing that Assumptions I1, I2, I3, and I4
are inconsistent. We demonstrate these nonconvexities by showing that the restricted
proﬁt functions of ﬁrms in I are nonconcave in the coordinate direction of a detrimental
producible public good (Theorem 2). These restricted proﬁt functions for ﬁrms in I
will be later employed in deﬁning a decentralized equilibrium for the economy.
For all ei ∈ RM+ , let Bi(ei) denote the barrier cone of P i(ei).12
Assumption I6: P i(ei) is strongly continuous in ei ∈ RM+ .13
Assumption I7: ∀ei ∈ RM+ , we have P i(ei) is semi-bounded.14
Deﬁne the restricted proﬁt function of i ∈ I as a function of ei ∈ RM+ and 〈po, pin〉 ∈
Bi(ei) as
π = Πˆi(ei, po, p
i
n) := max
oi,ni
po · oi + pin · ni
subject to
〈oi, ni〉 ∈ P i(ei).
(3.1)
The argmax of (3.1) is denoted by the function
〈oi, ni〉 = 〈oi(po, pie, pin), ni(po, pie, pin)〉. (3.2)
The following theorem, proof of which can be found in McFadden [1978], presents
some properties of the restricted proﬁt function.
12 As deﬁned by McFadden [1978], the barrier cone Bi(ei) of a set P i(ei) is the set of all prices p
such that p · x is bounded above for all x ∈ P i(ei).
13 A correspondence P i(ei) is strongly continuous in ei if it is continuous and its asymptotic cone is
an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. See McFadden.
14 The set P i(ei) is semi-bounded if int Bi(ei) = ∅, where int Bi(ei) is the interior of the set Bi(ei).
9
Externalities And Decentralization. August 18, 2006
Theorem 1: For i ∈ I, under Assumptions I2, I3, I4 (I5), I6, and I7, we have (i)
for each ei ∈ RM+ , Πˆi is a ﬁnite valued, linear homogeneous, convex, and continuous
function of 〈po, pin〉 ∈ int Bi(ei), (ii) for all 〈po, pin〉 ∈ ∩ei∈RM+ int B
i(ei), we have
Πˆi is non-increasing (non-decreasing) in eim ∈ R+, and ∃e¯i, e˜i ∈ RM+ with e¯im < e˜im
and e¯im′ = e˜
i
m′ ,∀ m′ = 1, . . . ,M and m′ = m such that Πˆi(e˜i, po, pin) < Πˆi(e¯i, po, pin)
(Πˆi(e˜i, po, p
i
n) > Πˆ
i(e¯i, po, p
i
n)), and (iii) Πˆ
i is continuous in ei ∈ RM+ and jointly
continuous in 〈ei, po, pin〉 ∈ RM+ × ∩ei∈RM+ int B(e
i).
We now show that the restricted proﬁt functions will not be concave in the coordi-
nate direction of a detrimental producible public good. In other words, given 〈po, pin〉,
the hypograph of the restricted proﬁt function in the space of ei and π is nonconvex.15
Theorem 2: For all i ∈ I,
(1) under Assumption I2, given any 〈po, pin〉 ∈ ∩ei∈RM+ int B
i(ei), there exists c ∈ R
such that Πˆi(ei, po, p
i
n) ≥ c for all ei ∈ RM+ , and
(2) under Assumptions I2, I3, I4, I6, and I7, for all 〈po, pin〉 ∈ ∩ei∈RM+ int B
i(ei), the
set {〈ei, π〉 ∈ RM+1+ |π ≤ Πˆi(ei, po, pin)} is nonconvex.
Proof:
(1) Under Assumption I2, ∃〈o¯i, n¯i〉 ∈ ⋂ei∈RM+ P
i(ei). Choose any 〈po, pin〉
∈ ∩ei∈RM+ int B
i(ei). Deﬁne c = po · o¯i + pin · n¯i. c has the required property from the
deﬁnition (3.1) of Πˆi.
(2) Suppose not. Then for all 〈po, pin〉 ∈ ∩ei∈RM+ int B
i(ei), we have A := {〈ei, π〉 ∈
RM+1+ |π ≤ Πˆi(ei, po, pin)} is convex. Assumption I4 and conclusion (ii) of Theorem 1
imply that ∃e¯i, e˜i ∈ RM+ with e¯im < e˜im and e¯im′ = e˜im′ ,∀ m′ = 1, . . . ,M and m′ = m
such that t˜ := Πˆi(e˜i, po, p
i
n) < Πˆ
i(e¯i, po, p
i
n) =: t¯. From conclusion (iii) of Theorem
1, Πˆi is continuous in ei. Hence, ∃ > 0 and δ > 0 such that Πˆi(ei, po, pin) ∈ N(t¯)
whenever ei ∈ Nδ(e¯i) and t˜ < t, ∀t ∈ N(t¯). From (1) of this theorem ∃c ∈ R such that
〈ei, c〉 ∈ A ∀ei ∈ RM+ . Choose λ ∈ [0, 1] such that ∗t := λc + (1 − λ)t¯ ∈ N(t¯). We can
freely choose ∗e i ∈ RM+ big enough such that e˜i = λ∗e i +(1−λ)e¯i. Hence, by maintained
convexity of set A, we have that 〈e˜i, ∗t 〉 ∈ A. But this means ∗t ≤ t˜. This contradicts
∗
t ∈ N(t¯).
3.3.2. Nonconvexities In Consumption.
Starrett and Zeckhauser argue that detrimental producible public goods can also
be sources of nonconvex preferences for consumers in H. The basic idea is the same
15 Let a ∈ Rn. We denote the  neighborhood of a ∈ Rn by N(a) ⊆ Rn.
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as the nonconvexities in the technology sets of ﬁrms in I. For all h ∈ H, if for every
level of welfare u there exists a particular combination of ordinary commodities that
can maintain the welfare of h at u, independent of the level of goods in M , then it can
be shown that the no-worse-than-set of consumer h, corresponding to utility level u, is
nonconvex. Here is an example (motivated by Starrett and Zeckhauser) that illustrates
this.
Example 1: There are two ordinary commodities, swimming and money spent on all
other goods, denoted by o˜h1 and o˜
h
2 , respectively. There is one producible public good,
pollution content of the river, denoted by e˜h. The consumption set is Xh = R3+, and
the utility function is
uh = αh
o˜h1
(e˜h + 1)
2 + β
ho˜h2 , α
h > 0, βh > 0. (3.3)
This example shows that the pleasure from any positive amount of swimming is ad-
versely aﬀected by the pollution content in the river. However, if h decides not to
swim, then he can maintain any level of welfare, independent of the pollution content
of the river, as long as he compensates the loss of pleasure from swimming by consuming
appropriate amount of the Hicks-Marshall money.
For all h ∈ H, the upper level sets of uh are denoted by ≥hu (∗u) := {〈o˜h, n˜h, e˜h〉 ∈
Xh| uh(o˜h, n˜h, e˜h) ≥ ∗u}. Similarly, for all h ∈ H, the strictly upper level sets of
uh are denoted by >hu (
∗u) := {〈o˜h, n˜h, e˜h〉 ∈ Xh| uh(o˜h, n˜h, e˜h) > ∗u}. We also de-
ﬁne restrictions of these sets to appropriate subspaces, e.g., ≥hu (∗u, e˜h) := {〈o˜h, n˜h〉 ∈
RK+L+ | 〈o˜h, n˜h, e˜h〉 ∈ Xh and uh(o˜h, n˜h, e˜h) ≥ ∗u}.
We distinguish between detrimental and beneﬁcial producible public goods for
consumers. Intuitively, m ∈ M is detrimental (beneﬁcial) for h ∈ H, if at any level
of welfare u, increases in its level requires a contraction (an expansion) in the set of
combinations of other commodities in order to maintain the level of welfare at u.
Deﬁnition: The good m ∈ M is a detrimental (beneﬁcial) producible public good for
consumer h ∈ H if for all u ∈ uh(Xh), we have ≥hu (u, e˜h) ⊆≥hu (u, ¯˜eh) ∀ ¯˜eh, e˜h ∈ RM+
such that ¯˜e
h
m < e˜
h
m (e˜
h
m > e˜
h
m) and ¯˜e
h
m′ = e˜
h
m′ ,∀ m′ = 1, . . . ,M, with m′ = m, and
≥hu (u, e˜h) ⊂≥hu (u, ¯˜eh) for some ¯˜eh, e˜h ∈ RM+ such that ¯˜ehm < e˜hm (¯˜ehm > e˜hm) and
¯˜e
h
m′ = e˜
h
m′ ,∀ m′ = 1, . . . ,M, with m′ = m.
Consider a consumer h ∈ H and u ∈ uh(Xh). We now present the relevant
assumptions that can axiomatize nonconvexities caused by externalities in consumption.
Assumption H1 (Convexity): ≥hu (u) is convex.
Assumption H2:
⋂
e˜h∈RM+ ≥
h
u (u, e˜
h) = ∅.
Assumption H3: ≥hu (u, e˜h) is closed ∀ e˜h ∈ RM+ .
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Assumption H4 (Detrimental Producible Public Good): m ∈M is a detrimen-
tal producible public good for h ∈ H.
Assumption H5 (Beneﬁcial Producible Public Good): m ∈ M is a beneﬁcial
producible public good for h ∈ H.
Theorem 3: Consider a consumer h ∈ H and u ∈ uh(Xh). Assumptions H1, H2,
H3, and H4 are inconsistent.
Proof. Analogous to Otani and Sicilian for technological nonconvexities.
As argued by Starrett and Zeckhauser, the nonconvexities caused by detrimental
producible public goods for preferences of consumers are not so compelling as techno-
logical nonconvexities: precisely, Assumption H2 is not so compelling as demonstrated
by the following example, which violates it, but satisﬁes Assumptions H1, H3, and H4.
Example 2: The consumption set is Xh = R3+, and the utility function is
uh =
(o˜h1 + α
h)(o˜h2 + β
h)
(e˜h + 1)
2 , α
h > 0, βh > 0. (3.4)
3.4. Market Failure.
We now distinguish between two types of producible public goods: by-product
public goods (such as pollution and nectar produced in an apple orchard that aids a
neighboring bee-keeping farm) and joint-product public goods (such as national de-
fense). We show that (abstracting from issues such as free riding and thin markets)
competitive markets will not exist in the case of both detrimental and beneﬁcial by-
product public goods, while they cannot be precluded in the case of joint-product public
goods.16
Suppose the index set of external eﬀects is partitioned into the sets M1 and M2.
Likewise, we partition any vector of external eﬀects z into z1 ∈ RM1 and z2 ∈ RM2 . For
all k ∈ K, denote Aj(ojk) = {zj1 ∈ RM1 | ∃〈oj1, . . . , ojk−1, ojk+1, . . . , ojK , dj , zj2〉 such that
〈oj , dj , zj1, zj2〉 ∈ Y j}. Assumptions J1, J1’, and J2 are postulated to capture externalities
like pollution. Assumptions J1 and J1’ are two alternative assumptions that reﬂect the
fact that disposal of these goods is costly. Assumption J2 captures the fact that they
are by-products. This is because, their production (or abatement) is correlated to
the production of ordinary commodities and joint- product public goods. Hence, their
production is only ancillary or secondary to the production of other commodities. For
16 A discussion of the distinction between by-products and jointly produced goods can be found in
Russell and Murty [2002].
12
Externalities And Decentralization. August 18, 2006
example, emission of green house gases is correlated to the use of fossil fuels, which are
used in producing ordinary commodities.
Assumption J1 (Costly Disposal 1): For all 〈oj , dj , zj1, zj2〉 ∈ RK ×RL−×RM2 , the
sets P j(oj , dj , zj2) are bounded below.
Assumption J1’ (Costly Disposal 2): For all 〈oj , dj , zj1, zj2〉 ∈ RK×RL−×RM2 if ∗z j1 ≥
zj1, then 〈oj , dj , ∗z j1, zj2〉 ∈ Y j .
Assumption J2 (By-production of Producible Public Goods): Either there
exists k ∈ K such that Aj(ojk) ⊆ Aj(o¯jk) whenever ojk ≥ o¯jk or there exists k ∈ K such
that Aj(o¯jk) ⊆ Aj(ojk) whenever ojk ≥ o¯jk.17
Deﬁnition. For all j ∈ J , the index set M1 ⊆ M comprises of by-products of Y j if
Assumptions J1 and J2 or Assumptions J1’ and J2 are true.
On the other hand, joint-product producible public goods are outputs of ﬁrms in
J whose disposal is free. These include the standard public goods. Assumption J3 is
such a free disposability condition.
Assumption J3 (Joint-production of Producible Public Goods): For all
〈oj , dj , zj1, zj2〉 ∈ Y j , if ∗z j2 ≤ zj2, then 〈oj , dj , zj1, ∗z j2〉 ∈ Y j .
Deﬁnition. For all j ∈ J , the index set M2 ⊆ M comprises of joint-products of Y j if
Assumption J3 holds.
Example 3: There is a single ordinary commodity guns (a private good), denoted by
o1, produced as a (main) output of a ﬁrm in j, which employs labor o2 and coal o3 as
inputs. Thus, coal causes the by-product, smoke, denoted by z1. The ﬁrm also produces
another (main) joint-product z2, namely, equipment that is bought for national defense–
a public good. In addition, it buys d amount of disposal capacity of the atmosphere to
discharge smoke. The technology of the ﬁrm is given by
Y =
{〈o, d, z1, z2〉 ∈ R3 ×R− ×R2+
∣∣z2o1
o2
≤ o3, z1 ≥ (o3)2, and d = −z1}. (3.5)
For all j ∈ J , suppose Bj denotes the barrier cone of Y j . Deﬁne the unrestricted
proﬁt function of j ∈ J for all 〈po, pd, pz〉 ∈ Bj as
π = Πj(po, pd, pz) := max
oj ,dj ,z
po · oj + pd · (dj + σj) + pz · z
subject to
〈oj , dj , zj〉 ∈ Y j .
(3.6)
17 For example, the ﬁrst condition reﬂects greater generation of the externality because of greater
production or use of output or input k, while the second condition may reﬂect the fact that some
k ∈ K is helpful for abatement.
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Suppose the solution to (3.6) is given by
〈oj , dj , zj〉 = 〈oj(po, pd, pz, ), dj(po, pd, pz), zj(po, pd, pz)〉. (3.7)
It can be easily proved that, because of the free disposability assumption J3, there
will be no solution to (3.6) if price of any good in M2 is negative. Similarly, if costly
disposability, as captured in Assumption J1′ holds, then there will be no solution to
(3.6) if price of any good in M1 is positive. We state this in the theorem below.
Theorem 4: Suppose Assumption J1’ is true. There is no solution to (3.6) if there
exists m ∈M1 such that pzm > 0 or if there exists m ∈M2 such that pzm < 0.
For all i ∈ I, pie ∈ RM and 〈po, pin〉 ∈ ∩ei∈RM+ int B
i(ei), deﬁne the unrestricted
proﬁt function
π = Πi(po, p
i
e, p
i
n) := max
ei∈RM+
pie · (ei − ξ) + Πˆi(ei, po, pin). (3.8)
The following theorem proves Starrett’s conclusion that proﬁts of the externality bearing
ﬁrms are unbounded (i.e., there is no solution to (3.8)) at positive prices of goods in M1.
This is true for both detrimental and beneﬁcial by-product public goods. The reason
for this result is Assumption I2, the unboundedness condition on technologies of ﬁrms
in I when M1 is not an empty set. This condition implies that, in the case of beneﬁcial
by-product public goods, any vector of positive prices for these goods does not belong
to the barrier cone of the technology, while in the case of detrimental by-product public
goods, the nonconvexities kick in.18
Theorem 5: Under Assumptions of Theorem 1, for all i ∈ I, for all 〈po, pin〉 ∈
∩ei∈RM+ int B
i(ei), there is no solution to (3.8) if there exists m ∈M such that piem > 0.
Proof: Conclusions of Theorems 1 and 2 hold under Assumptions I2, I3, and I6. Note,
problem (3.8) can equivalently be re-written as
π = Πi(po, p
i
e, p
i
n) := −pie · ξ+ max〈ai,bi〉∈RM+1+
pie · ai + bi
subject to
bi ≤ Πi(ei, po, pin).
(3.9)
18 A similar result can also be demonstrated in the case of consumers. Under Assumption H2, if
faced with a negative price for any good in M1 (that is, if they are paid to consume such a good), then
the consumers ﬁnd that they can any level of welfare with their budget constraint, so that their utility
maximization has no solution.
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Suppose 〈∗ai, ∗b i〉 solves (3.9). Then Πi(∗ai, po, pin) =
∗
b i. By conclusion (1) of Theorem
2 there exists c ∈ R such that c ≤ Πi(ei, po, pin), ∀ei ∈ RM+ . In particular, c ≤
∗
b . Let
Mi := {m ∈ M |piem > 0}. For all m ∈ M, pick e¯im ∈ R+ that solves
∑
m/∈M p
i
em ·
∗aim +
∑
m∈M p
i
em · e¯im + c =
∗
b i + pie · ∗ai. (e¯im for m ∈M exist as under our assumptions∗
b i − c + pie · ∗ai −
∑
m/∈M p
i
em · ∗aim ≥ 0.) Now freely choose e˜im  e¯im for all m ∈ M.
Deﬁne e˜i such that the mth component is e˜im whenever m ∈ M and is ∗aim whenever
m /∈ M. Then by conclusion (1) of Theorem 2, c ≤ Πi(e˜i, po, pin) and pie · e˜i + c >
pie · e¯i + c =
∗
b i + pie · ∗ai. A contradiction to 〈∗ai,
∗
b i〉 solves (3.9).
Thus, in the case of m ∈M1, we ﬁnd that, if all ﬁrms in J satisfy Assumption J1’,
then at a price pzm > 0 (that is, at a positive price received by ﬁrms in J for producing
the mth good) they would each like to supply an inﬁnite amount of the mth public good.
On the other hand, if price pzm < 0 (that is, when the ﬁrms in J pay a positive price
for producing the mth good), then the ﬁrms in I receive a positive price for consuming
the mth good (piem > 0). Hence, the ﬁrms in I would choose to consume an inﬁnite
amount of the mth public good. This demonstrates the market failure in the case of
both beneﬁcial and detrimental by-product public goods.
4. Collective Consumption Equilibrium.
To the extent the set M1 of by-product producible public goods is non empty, we are
once again confronted with Hurwicz’s negative result for the existence of non-wasteful
decentralized mechanisms for nonconvex economies. Failure of competitive markets for
goods in M1 was demonstrated in the previous section (precisely, a market equilibrium
cannot exist even if property rights were well established). In fact, any decentralized
mechanism based purely on transmission of information regarding shadow prices will
not ensure eﬃciency of the equilibrium in nonconvex economies. This is because, while
such mechanisms may ensure that the ﬁrst order conditions of Pareto optimality hold
at an equilibrium, in nonconvex economies the second order conditions for even a local
Pareto optimum may fail at the equilibrium. Thus, at these stationary points, there
may exist adjustments in the underlying allocations that are Pareto improving, that is,
if put to a vote, such adjustments would be unanimously accepted by all consumers.
We feel that the concept of a “public competitive equilibrium” proposed by Foley
[1967, 1970] oﬀers great scope for constructing eﬃcient decentralized procedures in
the case of producible public goods. Though Foley operated in convex economies, we
ﬁnd that, precisely because his mechanism allows decentralized choice based on both
price and quantity signals, it permits a concept of an equilibrium for general (including
nonconvex) economies that will always be eﬃcient.
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For all h ∈ H, let Bh(e˜h) := {〈po, p˜hn〉 ∈ RK+L|poo˜h+p˜hnn˜h is bounded below for all
〈o˜h, n˜h〉 ∈≥h
uh
(u, e˜h), ∀u}. For all e˜h ∈ RM+ , the externality restricted indirect util-
ity function of consumer h ∈ H is a function of his income rh ∈ R+ and prices
〈po, p˜hn〉 ∈ Bh(e˜h) such that
uh = V h(po, p˜
h
n, r
h, eh) := max
o˜h,n˜h
uh(o˜h, n˜h, eh)
subject to
〈o˜h, n˜h, eh〉 ∈ Xh, and
poo˜
h + p˜hnn˜
h ≤ rh.
(4.1)
Suppose the argmax of (4.1) is given by the functions
〈o˜h, n˜h〉 = 〈o˜h(po, p˜hn, rh, eh), n˜h(po, p˜hn, rh, eh)〉. (4.2)
If uh is continuous, then V h is continuous in its arguments.19 Denote a price system
by the vector p = 〈po, (p˜hn)h∈H , (pin)i∈I , pd, pz〉.
The equilibrium that will be deﬁned in this section involves a separation of the
ﬁnance from the production of public goods:20 an agency (perhaps the government)
is formed via the collective action of individual consumers to manage their collective
needs of the public good. This agency takes the market prices of the public goods as
given and collects contributions from consumers to ﬁnance the purchase of these goods
from the producers.21
Deﬁnition. A government proposal relative to the price system p is a proﬁle of in-
dividual lump-sum taxes for consumers T := (T h)h ∈ RH and levels of externalities
e ∈ RM+ , denoted by 〈T, e〉, such that
∑
h T
h = pz(e− ξ).
We derive a private ownership economy from the economy E. The structure of
ownership of resources is as described in section 2 and 〈θhi, θhj〉h,i,j denotes the proﬁle
of shares of consumers in the proﬁts of the ﬁrms. The private ownership economy will
be denoted by Epvt = 〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i, (Y j)j , (ωh, θhi, θhj , σj)h,i,j , η, ξ〉.
19 See Diewert [1974].
20 This is true also of most equilibrium concepts in the public goods literature, e.g., the Lindahl
equilibrium can be interpreted in terms of both creation of personalized markets for the public goods
and of an agency collecting personalized contributions from the consumers of public good to ﬁnance
the purchase from the producers.
21 In the context of detrimental external eﬀects, this amounts to the agency choosing the level of
rights to pollute to sell to the generating ﬁrms and redistributing proceeds to consumers as transfers.
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The income of any h ∈ H at a given price system p, a given distribution of proﬁt
shares 〈(θhi)h,i, (θhj)h,j〉, and a government proposal 〈T, e〉 is
rh = rh(p, e, T h)
= po ω
h + p˜hnη +
∑
i
θhiΠˆi(po, p
i
n, e) +
∑
j
θhjΠj(po, pd, pz)− T h, ∀h, (4.3)
where, for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J , Πˆi(po, pin, e) and Πj(po, pd, pz) are deﬁned as in (3.1)
and (3.6), respectively. The externality restricted indirect utility function of consumer
h ∈ H is obtained from (4.1) as uh = V h(po, p˜hn, e, rh(p, e, T h)).
Budget proposals relative to the current system of prices are oﬀered to all con-
sumers by the collective action. A budget proposal is accepted iﬀ it is not unanimously
rejected by all the consumers in favor of all other government budget proposal relative
to the current system of prices.
Deﬁnition. A government budget proposal 〈T, e〉 relative to price system p, is unani-
mously rejected in favor of another government budget proposal 〈∗T , ∗e〉 relative to price
system p if, for all h ∈ H, we have
V h(p, e, rh(p, e, T h)) < V h(p, ∗e, rh(p, ∗e, ∗T h)). (4.4)
Thus, the collective action expresses the collective demand for the public goods by
the consumers at the prevailing market prices for these goods. It does this by aggregat-
ing over individual consumer preferences by using the unanimity criteria. As Malinvaud
[1985] observes, “the economy will preserve some degree of decentralization with the
consumers, the ﬁrms, and the ‘public authority’ acting in a relatively autonomous way”.
He has aptly called this class of equilibria, “politico-economic equilibria.”
Deﬁnition. A collective consumption equilibrium (CCE) of Epvt = 〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i,
(Y j)j , (ω
h, θhi, θhj , σj)h,i,j , η, ξ〉 is a conﬁguration 〈p, e, T, (o˜h)h, (oi)i, (oj)j , (n˜h)h,
(ni)i, (d
j)j , (z
j)j〉 such that (i) 〈(o˜h, n˜h)h, (oi, ni)i, (oj , dj , zj)j〉 solve (4.2), (3.2), and
(3.7), respectively, for 〈p, e, T 〉 and rh deﬁned as in (4.3) for all h ∈ H; (ii) 〈e, T 〉 is a
government budget proposal relative to price system p that is not unanimously rejected
in favor of any other government budget proposal relative to price system p; and (iii)
∑
h
o˜h =
∑
i
oi +
∑
j
oj + ω,
e− ξ =
∑
j
zj ,
n− η := ni − η = n˜h − η =
∑
j
(dj + σj), ∀h ∈ H, i ∈ I.
(4.5)
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Lemma 1. Suppose uh satisﬁes local nonsatiation for all h ∈ H and 〈p, e, T, (o˜h)h,
(oi)i, (o
j)j , (n˜
h)h, (n
i)i, (d
j)j , (z
j)j〉 is a CCE of a private ownership economy Epvt =
〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i, (Y j)j , (ωh, θhi, θhj , σj)h,i,j , η, ξ〉 with n− η = 0.22 Then, we have
∑
h
p˜hn −
∑
i
pin = pd. (4.6)
Proof. Since, uh satisﬁes local nonsatiation for all h ∈ H, the consumer budget con-
straints hold as equalities. Summing up over consumer budget constraints, employing
the deﬁnitions of Πj and Πˆi for all j ∈ J and i ∈ I and a government budget proposal
relative to p, and using conditions (4.5) we obtain
po
∑
h
o˜h +
∑
h
p˜hnn =
∑
i
Πi(po, p
i
n, e)−
∑
h
T h +
∑
j
Πj(po, pd, pz) + poω +
∑
h
p˜hnη
⇒ po
∑
h
o˜h +
∑
h
p˜hn[n− η] =
∑
i
[poo
i + pin[n− η]]−
∑
h
T h
+
∑
j
[poo
j + pd[d
j + σj ] + pzz
j ] + poω
⇒ [n− η][
∑
h
p˜hn −
∑
i
pin − pd] = pze−
∑
h
T h = 0
⇒
∑
h
p˜hn −
∑
i
pin = pd.
(4.7)
4.1. Every CCE is a Pareto Optimum.
We now prove the major result of this paper, i.e., the optimality of a collective
consumption equilibrium.
Theorem 6: Suppose uh satisﬁes local nonsatiation for all h ∈ H and 〈p, e, T, (o˜h)h,
(oi)i, (o
j)j , (n˜
h)h, (n
i)i, (d
j)j , (z
j)j〉 with n−η = 0 is a CCE of a private ownership econ-
omy Epvt = 〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i, (Y j)j , (ωh, θhi, θhj , σj)h,i,j , η, ξ〉 derived from economy E.
Then the CCE is a weak Pareto optimum of economy E.
22 The utility function u(x) satisﬁes local-nonsatiation if for all ∗u ∈ R, we have ≥u (∗u) ⊆ Cl >u (∗u).
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Proof: Suppose 〈p, e, T, (o˜h)h, (oi)i, (oj)j , (n˜h)h, (ni)i, (dj)j , (zj)j〉 is a CCE of Epvt but
it is not a weak Pareto optimum of E. Then there exists a feasible allocation of E,
〈(∗xh)h, (∗yi)i, (∗yj)j〉, such that uh(∗˜oh, ∗˜eh, ∗˜nh) > uh(o˜h, e˜h, n˜h) for all h. Since,23
∑
h
∗˜
oh =
∑
i
∗o i +
∑
j
∗oj + ω,
∗eh = ∗e =
∑
j
∗z j + ξ, ∀h,
∗˜
nh = ∗n =
∑
j
∗
dj + η, ∀h,
(4.8)
we have
po
∑
h
∗˜
oh + pz
∗e + pd[∗n− η] = po
∑
i
∗o i + po
∑
j
∗oj + poω + pz[
∑
j
∗z j + ξ] + pd
∑
j
∗
dj
≤
∑
j
Πj(po, pd, pz) + po
∑
i
∗o i +
∑
i
pin[
∗n− η]−
∑
i
pin[
∗n− η] + poω + pzξ
≤
∑
i
Πi(po, p
i
n,
∗e) +
∑
j
Πj(po, pd, pz)−
∑
i
pin[
∗n− η] + poω + pzξ.
(4.9)
Hence, employing (4.6), we have
po
∑
h
∗˜
oh −
∑
i
Πi(po, p
i
n,
∗e) +
∑
h
p˜hn
∗n ≤
∑
j
Πj(po, pd, pz)− pz[∗e − ξ] + poω +
∑
h
p˜hnη.
(4.10)
On the other hand, local non-satiation of consumer preferences implies that the aggre-
gate budget constraint of the consumers holds as an equality.24
po
∑
h
o˜h −
∑
i
Πi(po, p
i
n, e) +
∑
h
T h +
∑
h
p˜hnn =
∑
j
Πj(po, pd, pz) + poω +
∑
h
p˜hnη.
(4.11)
Subtracting (4.10) from (4.11), we obtain
∑
h
T h + po
∑
h
[o˜h − ∗˜oh]−
∑
i
[Πi(po, p
i
n, e)− Πi(po, pin, ∗e)] +
∑
h
p˜hn[n− ∗n] ≥ pz[∗e − ξ].
(4.12)
For all h, choose
∗
T h = T h + po[o˜
h − ∗˜oh]−
∑
i
θhi[Πi(po, p
i
n, e)− Πi(po, pin, ∗e)] + p˜hn[n− ∗n]. (4.13)
23 For convenience, we have assumed σ = 0.
24 n := n˜h = ni, ∀i ∈ I and ∀h ∈ H.
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Then, it follows from (4.12) and (4.13) that
∑
h
∗
T h ≥ pz[∗e − ξ]. (4.14)
Further, from (4.13) and (4.11), we have
∗
T h + po
∗˜
oh −
∑
i
θhiΠi(po, p
i
n,
∗e) + p˜hn∗n = T h + poo˜h −
∑
i
θhiΠi(po, p
i
n, e) + p˜
h
nn
=
∑
j
θhj Π
j(po, pd, pz) + poω
h + p˜hnη.
(4.15)
This implies that, for all h ∈ H, we have
po
∗˜
oh + p˜hn
∗n =
∑
i
θhiΠi(po, p
i
n,
∗e)
∑
j
θhj Π
j(po, pd, pz) + poω
h + p˜hnη −
∗
T h. (4.16)
Thus, the bundle 〈∗˜oh, ∗˜nh〉 is aﬀordable with income rh(p, ∗T h, ∗e) for all h ∈ H. Now
deﬁne A such that ∑
h
∗
T h = A + pz[
∗e − ξ]. (4.17)
From (4.14), we have A ≥ 0. Deﬁne, for all h ∈ H,
Tˆ h =
∗
T h − A
H
. (4.18)
Then, for all h ∈ H, we have
rh(p, Tˆ h, ∗e) = rh(p, ∗T h, ∗e) + A
H
≥ rh(p, ∗T h, ∗e), (4.19)
and
V h(p, ∗e, rh(p, Tˆ h, ∗e) ≥ V h(p, ∗e, rh(p, ∗T h, ∗e) ≥ uh(∗˜oh, ∗˜nh, ∗e) > uh(o˜h, n˜h, e). (4.20)
Also, ∑
h
Tˆ h = pz[
∗e − ξ]. (4.21)
Thus, we have created a government budget proposal, 〈Tˆ , ∗e〉 relative to price system
p such that the proposal 〈T, e〉 will be unanimously rejected in favor of 〈Tˆ , ∗e〉. This
contradicts the fact that 〈p, e, T, (o˜h)h, (oi)i, (oj)j , (n˜h)h, (ni)i, (dj)j , (zj)j〉 is a CCE of
Epvt.
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4.2. Decentralization of a Pareto Optimum as a Restricted Collective Consumption
Equilibrium.
Because of the technological nonconvexities that can arise for ﬁrms in I, we ﬁnd
that a given Pareto optimum of E is only a restricted collective consumption equilibrium,
that is, it is a collective consumption equilibrium of a restricted economy where the set
of government budget proposals, from which the consumers vote, is restricted to those
for which the levels of the public goods are ﬁxed (in this case, at the Pareto optimal
levels). So consumers accept or reject based on the distribution of the contributions
alone.
Deﬁnition. A restricted collective consumption equilibrium (RCCE) of
Epvt = 〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i, (Y j)j , (ωh, θhi, θhj , σj)h,i,j , η, ξ〉 is a conﬁguration
〈p, e, T, (o˜h)h, (oi)i, (oj)j , (n˜h)h, (ni)i, (dj)j , (zj)j〉 such that
(i) 〈(o˜h, n˜h)h, (oi, ni)i, (oj , dj , zj)j〉 solve (4.2), (3.2), and (3.7), respectively, for 〈p, e, T 〉
and rh deﬁned as in (4.3) for all h ∈ H; (ii) 〈e, T 〉 is a government budget proposal rela-
tive to price system p that is not unanimously rejected in favor of any other government
budget proposal 〈e¯, T¯ 〉 relative to price system p with e¯ = e; and (iii)
∑
h
o˜h =
∑
i
oi +
∑
j
oj + ω,
e− ξ =
∑
j
zj ,
n− η := ni − η = n˜h − η =
∑
j
(dj + σj), ∀h ∈ H, i ∈ I.
(4.22)
Theorem 7: Suppose 〈(∗xh)h, (∗yi)i, (∗yj)j〉 is a weak Pareto optimum of E and the
following assumptions hold:
(i) ∗xh ∈ int Xh, for all h ∈ H,25
(ii) uh is quasi-concave, locally nonsatiated, and continuous, for all h ∈ H,
(iii) Y j is convex, closed, and int Y j = ∅ for all j ∈ J , and
(iv) Y i is closed, int Y i = ∅, and P i(ei) is convex for all ei ∈ RM+ and for all i ∈ I,
Then for every distribution of initial resources (including collective ownership of ξ and
η) and systems of shares 〈(ωh)h, (θhi)h,i, (θhj)h,j , (σj)j〉, there exists a price system ∗p
and taxes
∗
T such that the implied conﬁguration 〈∗p, ∗e, ∗T , (∗˜oh)h, (∗o i)i, (∗oj)j , (∗˜nh)h, (∗ni)i,
(
∗
dj)j , (
∗z j)j〉 is a RCCE of Epvt = 〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i, (Y j)j , (ωh, θhi, θhj , σj)h,i,j , η, ξ〉,
derived from economy E.
25 An alternate assumption, called irreducibility, can be found in Ghosal and Polemarchakis [1999].
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Proof: Assumptions (ii), (iii), and (iv) in the theorem ensure that Assumptions (a) to
(d) of Lemma 2 hold. Hence, conclusions of Lemma 2 follow, and let us deﬁne ∗po = ∗ρo,
∗pz = ∗ρe, ∗˜phn =
∗˜
ρhn, for all h ∈ H, ∗pin = ∗ρin, for all i ∈ I, and ∗pd = ∗ρn.
Pick any distribution of endowments and proﬁt shares 〈(ωh)h, (θhi)h,i, (θhj)h,j , (σj)j〉.
Since ∗ρj ∈ N(Y j , ∗yj) for all j ∈ J and Y j is convex, from Lemma A.8 it follows that
Πj(∗po, ∗pd, ∗pz) = ∗po · ∗oj + ∗pd · [
∗
dj +σj ]+ ∗pz · ∗z j . Since ∗ρi ∈ N(Y i, ∗yi) and P i(∗e i) is convex
for all i ∈ I, it follows from Lemmas A.8 and A.9 that Πˆi(∗po, ∗pin, ∗e) = ∗po · ∗o i+∗pin ·[∗ni−η].
For all h ∈ H, we deﬁne ∗T h, ∗Ah, and ∗rh as
−∗T h = ∗po ∗˜oh + ∗˜phn∗n−
∑
i
θhiΠˆi(∗po, ∗pin, ∗e)−
∑
j
θhjΠj(∗po, ∗pd, ∗pz)− ∗poω − ∗˜phnη
=: ∗po ∗˜oh + ∗˜phn∗n−
∗
Ah −
∑
i
θhiΠˆi(∗po, ∗pin, ∗e), and
∗rh := rh(∗ph, ∗e, ∗T h) = −∗T h + ∗Ah +
∑
i
θhiΠˆi(∗po, ∗pin, ∗e).
(4.23)
For all h ∈ H let uh(∗xh) = ∗uh. Since −∗˜ρh ∈ N(≥hu (∗uh), ∗xh), Xh is convex, uh
satisﬁes local nonsatiation and is continuous and quasiconcave for all h ∈ H, we have
≥hu (∗uh) is convex, ∗xh is a boundary point of ≥hu (∗uh), and
∗˜
ρh · ∗xh ≤ ∗˜ρh · xh for all
xh ∈≥hu (∗uh).26 From Lemmas A.8 and A.9 it follows that, for all h ∈ H, ≥hu (∗uh, ∗e)
is also convex, −〈∗˜ρho ,
∗˜
ρhn〉 ∈ N(≥hu (∗uh, ∗e), 〈
∗˜
oh,
∗˜
nh〉), and ∗˜ρho ·
∗˜
oh +
∗˜
ρhn ·
∗˜
nh ≤ ∗˜ρho · o˜h +∗˜
ρhn · n˜h for all 〈o˜h, n˜h〉 ∈≥hu (∗uh, ∗e). In addition, since ∗xh ∈ int Xh for all h ∈ H,
we have 〈∗˜oh, ∗˜nh〉 ∈ int{〈o˜h, n˜h〉| 〈o˜h, n˜h, ∗e〉 ∈ Xh}. Hence, for all h ∈ H, we have
uh(
∗˜
oh,
∗˜
nh, ∗e) ≥ uh(o˜h, n˜h, ∗e) for all 〈o˜h, n˜h〉 ∈ {〈o˜h, n˜h〉| 〈o˜h, n˜h, ∗e〉 ∈ Xh} such that
∗˜
ρho · o˜h +
∗˜
ρhn · n˜h ≤
∗˜
ρho ·
∗˜
oh +
∗˜
ρhn ·
∗˜
nh = ∗rh (the last equality follows from (4.23)).27 Thus,
V h(∗po, ∗˜phn, ∗e, ∗rh) = ∗uh for all h ∈ H.
Thus, the conﬁguration 〈∗p, ∗e, ∗T , (∗˜oh)h, (∗o i)i, (∗oj)j , (∗˜nh)h, (∗ni)i, (
∗
dj)j , (
∗z j)j〉 satisﬁes parts
(i) and (iii) of the deﬁnition of a RCCE of Epvt. We now show that part (ii) of this
deﬁnition is also satisﬁed.
First note, local nonsatiation of uh for all h ∈ H, feasibility of the Pareto allocation,
and the fact that ∗pd =
∑
h
∗
p˜hn−
∑
i
∗pin at the Pareto optimum (this follows from Lemma
2) imply, as a consequence of the Walras law, that
∑
h
∗
T h + ∗pz[∗e − ξ] = 0. Suppose,
there existed a government budget proposal 〈∗e, T 〉 relative to price system ∗p such that
26 See Debreu [1959].
27 See Debreu [1959].
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the government budget proposal 〈∗e, ∗T 〉 is unanimously rejected in favor of government
budget proposal 〈∗e, T 〉.
Suppose, for all h ∈ H, 〈o˜h, n˜h〉 solves (4.2) for price system ∗p and income rh =
rh(∗p, T h, ∗e). Since, 〈∗˜oh, ∗˜nh〉 solves (4.2) for price system ∗p and income ∗rh = rh(∗p, ∗T h, ∗e)
and local nonsatiation is true, we have
∗˜
ρho · o˜h +
∗˜
ρhn · n˜h =
∑
i
θhiΠˆi(∗po, ∗pin, ∗e)−
∑
j
θhjΠj(∗po, ∗pd, ∗pz)− ∗poω − ∗˜phnη − T h
=: B − T h, and
∗˜
ρho ·
∗˜
oh +
∗˜
ρhn ·
∗˜
nh =
∑
i
θhiΠˆi(∗po, ∗pin, ∗e)−
∑
j
θhjΠj(∗po, ∗pd, ∗pz)− ∗poω − ∗˜phnη −
∗
T h
=: B − ∗T h.
(4.24)
Hence, for all h ∈ H, we have
∗˜
ρho · o˜h +
∗˜
ρhn · n˜h + T h =
∗˜
ρho ·
∗˜
oh +
∗˜
ρhn ·
∗˜
nh +
∗
T h. (4.25)
Summing up over all h and recalling that
∑
h T
h = ∗pz∗e =
∑
h
∗
T h, we have
∑
h
∗˜
ρho · o˜h +
∑
h
∗˜
ρhn · n˜h + ∗pz∗e =
∑
h
∗˜
ρho ·
∗˜
oh +
∑
h
∗˜
ρhn ·
∗˜
nh + ∗pz∗e. (4.26)
This implies, from Lemma 2 and our deﬁnition of ∗pz, that
∑
h
∗˜
ρho · o˜h +
∑
h
∗˜
ρhn · n˜h +[
∑
h
∗˜
ρhe −
∑
i
∗ρie]∗e =
∑
h
∗˜
ρho ·
∗˜
oh +
∑
h
∗˜
ρhn ·
∗˜
nh +[
∑
h
∗˜
ρhe −
∑
i
∗ρie]∗e.
(4.27)
Hence, we have
∑
h
[∗˜
ρho · o˜h +
∗˜
ρhn · n˜h +
∗˜
ρhe
∗e] =
∑
h
[∗˜
ρho ·
∗˜
oh +
∗˜
ρhn ·
∗˜
nh +
∗˜
ρhe
∗e]. (4.28)
Since, 〈o˜h, n˜h, ∗e〉 ∈>hu (∗uh) and uh is continuous, we have 〈o˜h, n˜h, ∗e〉 ∈ int >hu (∗uh) and
there exists x¯ := 〈¯˜oh, ¯˜nh, ∗e〉 ∈>hu (∗uh) such that x¯h ·
∗˜
ρh < ∗xh · ∗˜ρh. This contradicts the
fact that, for all h ∈ H, ∗xh is cost minimizing in ≥hu (∗uh) at shadow price vector
∗˜
ρh.
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5. Conclusions.
In this paper, we reconcile Arrow/Starrett and Boyd and Conley general equilib-
rium models of externality. We argue that the Boyd and Conley externalities arise as
a result of missing markets for certain nonproducible goods, which have public good
properties for some agents. Boyd and Conley’s assumption that these resources are
bounded, alleviates the externality problem once Coasian markets are created for these
goods. Arrow/Starrett externalities, on the other hand, have been argued as arising be-
cause of missing markets for certain producible goods. We show that these will continue
to remain as sources of technological nonconvexities. To the extent these are prevalent,
Hurwicz’s impossibility result in ﬁnding eﬃcient ﬁnite dimensional decentralized mech-
anisms applies. In this paper we propose an eﬃcient decentralized mechanism motivated
by the concept of a “public competitive equilibrium” proposed by Foley [1967, 1970].
Precisely because his mechanism allows decentralized choice based on both price and
quantity signals, it permits a concept of an equilibrium for general (including noncon-
vex) economies that will always be eﬃcient.
This ﬁrst-best model also provides a benchmark to study second-best situations
when the collective action is subject also to informational constraints in implementing
the personalized taxes or transfers in its budget proposals. Further, we conjecture
that it could also provide a framework of analysis for studying second-best settings for
determining externality (including standard public goods) levels as well as redistribution
policies based on an optimal mix of the beneﬁt and ability to pay principles. Thus,
these could be motivated by at least two dimensional informational asymmetries: the
free rider problem and incentives of agents to incorrectly reveal their true abilities.28
Recently too, a public good purchase approach has been proposed by Bradford
[2005] and Guesnerie [2005, 2006] for control of climate change. These papers promote
the abatement of green house gases as a global public good that can be purchased by
an agency of member countries who make contributions to ﬁnance this purchase. At
a ﬁrst level, these readings are suggestive of a collective consumption equilibrium in
the context of global externalities. But the issues of the global economy impose more
game-theoretic structure to this problem.
APPENDIX
Lemma 2, which is employed in proving Theorem 7, uses the Clarke’s normal cone
(the negative polar cone to the Clarke’s tangent cone) to identify the cones of shadow
28 For an example of second best policies based on two dimensional uncertainties, see Beaudry,
Blackorby, and Szalay [2006].
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prices associated with a Pareto optimal allocation. We present below some deﬁnitions
and some properties of these cones, which were used to prove Lemma 2.29
Let Y ⊆ Rn and y ∈ Cl Y .30 We present below the deﬁnition and properties in the form
of Lemmas of the Clarke’s Tangent and Normal Cones. These can be found in Clarke
[1975, 1983, 1989], Rockafellar [1978], Khan and Vohra [1987], and Cornet [1989].
Deﬁnition: The Tangent Cone for Y relative to y is the set T (Y, y) :=
{
x ∈ Rn∣∣ ∀
sequences tk → 0 and yk → y with yk ∈ Cl Y, ∃ a sequence xk → x such that, for all
large enough k, yk + tkxk ∈ Cl Y
}
.
Remark A.1: T (Y, y) is a closed and convex cone with vertex 0n.
Lemma A.1: The Interior of the Tangent Cone for Y relative to y is the set int T (Y, y)
:=
{
x ∈ Rn∣∣∃  > 0, η > 0, δ > 0 such that, ∀ λ ∈ [0, η], ({y′}+λCl N(x)) ⊆ Y, ∀ y′ ∈
(Cl Y ∩ Cl Nδ(y))
}
.
Deﬁnition: The Negative Polar of a set A ⊆ Rn is the set A− := {p ∈ Rn∣∣p · x ≤
0 ∀ x ∈ A}.
Remark A.2: A− = (Cl A)−
Deﬁnition: The Normal Cone to Y relative to y is the set N(Y, y) := T (Y, y)−.
Remark A.3: N(Y, y) = (int T (Y, y))− and N(Y, y) is a closed and convex cone with
vertex 0n.
Lemma A.2: Let Y =
{
yˆ ∈ Rn∣∣f(yˆ) ≤ 0}, where f is continuous. If f is diﬀerentiable
at y and f(y) = 0, then T (Y, y) =
{
x ∈ Rn∣∣x·∇f(y) ≤ 0}, and N(Y, y) = {p ∈ Rn∣∣p =
λ∇f(y), λ ≥ 0}.
Lemma A.3: Let Y ⊆ Z, where Z is a closed subset of Rn. Then T (Y, y) ⊆ T (Z, y)
and N(Z, y) ⊆ N(Y, y).
Lemma A.4: Let Y i ∈ Rn, int Y i = ∅, i = 1, . . . ,m, and y ∈ ∩iCl Y i.
T Then ∩iint T (Y i, yi) = int T (∩iY i, y). If ∩iint T (Y i, yi) = ∅, then N(∩iY i, y) =∑
i N(Y
i, yi).
Lemma A.5: Let K1, . . . , Kp, be p open and non-empty convex cones with vertex 0
n in
Rn. Then
⋂p
i=1 Ki = ∅ iﬀ ∀ i = 1, . . . , p, ∃ qi ∈ K−i with qi = 0n for some i = 1, . . . , p
such that
∑
i q
i = 0n.
Lemma A.6: Let Y :=
∏l
i=1 Y
i, and y := 〈y1, . . . , yl〉 ∈ Y , where yi ∈ Y i ⊆ Rn, i =
1, . . . , l. Then int T (Y, y) =
∏l
i=1 int T (Y
i, yi), and N(Y, y) =
∏l
i=1 N(Y
i, yi).
Lemma A.7: Suppose Y is convex and int Y = ∅. Then int T (Y, y) = ∅.
29 This conceptualization of shadow prices for general cases and other alternative conceptualizations
have been extensively used in the literature on nonconvex economies, motivated by issues such as
increasing returns. Readings in this literature include Beato [1982], Beato and Mas-Colell [1985],
Bonniseau and Cornet [1990], Brown and Heal [1979], Guesnerie (1975), Heal [1999], Khan and Vohra
[1987], Quinzii [1992], etc.
30 We denote the closure of a set Y ∈ Rn by Cl Y and the interior of Y relative to Rn by int Y .
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Lemma A.8: Suppose Y is convex and y belongs to the boundary of Y . Then for all
a ∈ N(Y, y), the hyperplane with normal a and constant a ·y is a supporting hyperplane
to Y at y.
Lemma A.9: Suppose we partition y as y = 〈y1, y2〉, a = 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ N(Y, y), and
A1 := {y¯1| ∃y¯2 such that 〈y¯1, y¯2〉 ∈ Y }. Then a1 ∈ N(A1, y1).
Ground Work for Lemma 2.
Given the economy E = 〈(Xh, uh)h, (Y i)i, (Y j)j , ω, η + σ, ξ〉 , we construct a new
economy E with K + (M + L)(H + I) commodities from the original economy E along
the lines of Milleron. A typical vector in RK+(M+L)(H+I), which will be denoted by N
will be written as 〈o, e˜1, . . . , e˜H , n˜1, . . . , n˜H , e1, . . . , eI , n1, . . . , nI〉.
The consumption set of consumer h is X h = {χh ∈ N+ | 〈o, e˜h, n˜h〉 ∈ Xh, and
〈e˜h′ , n˜h′〉 = 0, ∀h′ = h}. The utility function for consumer h ∈ H in this economy is
derived from uh in an obvious way as Uh. We deﬁne the production set of producer i in a
similar way and denote it by Y i. A typical production bundle for i is denoted by γi ∈ N .
The production set of j ∈ J is deﬁned as Yj := {γj ∈ N | e˜h = ei = zj and n˜h = ni =
dj , ∀i ∈ I and h ∈ H, o = oj , and 〈oj , zj , dj〉 ∈ Y j}. The vector of resources in this
economy is Ω = 〈ω, ξ, . . . , ξ, η + σ, . . . , η + σ, ξ, . . . , ξ, η + σ, . . . , η + σ〉 ∈ N .
Deﬁnition: A feasible state for E = 〈(X h,Uh)h, (Y i)i, (Yj)j ,Ω〉 is a tuple 〈(χh)h, (γi)i,
(γj)j〉 such that χh ∈ X h, ∀h ∈ H; γi ∈ Y i,∀i ∈ I; γj ∈ Yj , ∀j ∈ J ; and
∑
h
χh =
∑
i
γi +
∑
j
γj + Ω. (5.1)
Deﬁnition: A feasible state of E 〈(∗χh)h, (∗γi)i, (∗γj)j〉 is Pareto optimal if there does
not exist another feasible state of E 〈(χh)h, (γi)i, (γj)j〉 such that Uh(χh) ≥ Uh(∗χh), ∀h
and Uh(χh) > Uh(∗χh) for some h.
For all h and ∗χh ∈ X h, we deﬁne
Rh(∗χh) :={χh ∈ X h|Uh(χh) ≥ Uh(∗χh)} and
P h(∗χh) :={χh ∈ X h|Uh(χh) > Uh(∗χh)}.
(5.2)
Lemma 2 (Support Prices at a Pareto Optimum). Let 〈(∗χh)h, (∗γi)i, (∗γj)j〉 be a
Pareto optimal state of E . Suppose Y i and Yj are closed for all i and j, Uh is continuous
for all h, and the following hold:
(a) int T (Rh(∗χh), ∗χh)) = ∅,∀h,
(b) int T (Y i, ∗γi) = ∅, ∀i ∈ I,
(c) int T (Yj , ∗γj) = ∅, ∀j ∈ J ,
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(d) There exists h for whom Rh(∗χh) ⊆ Cl P h(∗χh) (existence of locally nonsatiated
consumers).
Then for all h ∈ H, i ∈ I, and j ∈ J , there exists −
∗
ρ˜h ∈ N(Rh(∗χh), ∗χh), ∗ρi ∈
N(Y i, ∗γi), and ∗ρj ∈ N(Yj , ∗γj), not all equal to 0, such that
1.
∗˜
ρho =
∗ρio = ∗ρjo, ∀h, i, j,
2. ∗ρje =
∑
h
∗˜
ρhe −
∑
i
∗ρie =: ∗ρe, ∀j and
3. ∗ρjn =
∑
h
∗˜
ρhn −
∑
i
∗ρin =: ∗ρn, ∀j.
Proof: Let us represent any vector u ∈ N by u = 〈(χh)h, (γi)i, (γj)j〉. For all h ∈ H we
deﬁne the following set in N : (Rh(∗χh)) := {u ∈ N ∣∣χh ∈ Rh(∗χh)}. Similarly, we deﬁne
P h(∗χh)), (Yˆ i) and (Yˆj) for all h, i, and j. Let Wk :=
{
u ∈ N ∣∣ ∑h o˜hk ≤
∑
i o
i
k+
∑
j o
j
k+
ωk
}
,∀ k, W˜ he :=
{
u ∈ N ∣∣e˜h − ξ ≤ ∑j zj
}
,∀h, W ie :=
{
u ∈ N ∣∣ei − ξ ≤ ∑j zj
}
,∀i,
W˜ hn :=
{
u ∈ N ∣∣n˜h − η ≤ ∑j dj + σ
}
,∀h, W in :=
{
u ∈ N ∣∣ni − η ≤ ∑j dj + σ
}
,∀i.
Let ∗u := 〈(∗χh)h, (∗γi)i, (∗γj)j〉. It follows from Lemma A.6 and the maintained assump-
tions (a) to (c) that int T ((Rh(∗χh)), ∗u) = ∅, ∀h, int T ((Y i), ∗u) = ∅, ∀i, and
int T ((Yj), ∗u) = ∅, ∀j. From Lemma A.2 above it follows that int T (Wk, ∗u),
int T (W˜ he ,
∗u), int T (W ie , ∗u), int T (W˜ hn , ∗u), and int T (W in, ∗u) are not empty for all k, h, i,
and j. Next, note that since ∗u corresponds to a Pareto optimum we have31
V :=
⋂
h
(Rh(∗χh))
⋂
h is LNS
(P h(∗χh))
⋂
i
(Y i)
⋂
j
(Yj)
⋂
k
Wk
⋂
i
⋂
t=e,n
W it
⋂
h
⋂
t=e,n
W˜ ht = ∅.
(5.3)
We show that under the maintained assumption (d), this implies that
Vˆ :=
⋂
h
int T ((Rh(∗χh)), ∗u)
⋂
i
int T ((Y i), ∗u)
⋂
j
int T ((Yj), ∗u)
⋂
k
int T (Wk,
∗u)
⋂
i
⋂
t=e,n
int T (W it ,
∗u)
⋂
h
⋂
t=e,n
int T (W˜ ht ,
∗u) = ∅.
(5.4)
Suppose not. Then using the deﬁnition of the interior of the tangent cone, we can show
that ∃v ∈ Vˆ and 〈δ, , η〉  0, such that
∗u + λN(v) ⊆
⋂
h
(Rh(∗χh))
⋂
i
(Y i)
⋂
j
(Yj)
⋂
k
Wk
⋂
i
⋂
t=e,n
W it
⋂
h
⋂
t=e,n
W˜ ht , ∀ λ ∈ [0, η].
(5.5)
Since there exists h′ such that Rh
′
(∗χh′) ⊆ Cl P h′(∗χh′), we have ∗u+λN(v) ⊆ Cl P h′(∗χh′),
∀λ ∈ [0, η]. Pick a ∈ ∗u + λN(v) for a λ ∈ [0, η]. Then a ∈ (Cl P h′(∗χh′)). For any
δ > 0 such that Nδ(a) ⊆ ∗u + λN(v), since a is a limit point of (Cl P h′(∗χh′)), we have
31 In the expression below, “LNS” stands for “locally nonsatiated”.
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Nδ(a) ∩ (P h′(∗χh′)) = ∅ . Hence ∃ b ∈ [Nδ(a) ∩ (P h′(∗χh′))] ⊆ ∗u + λN(v). Thus b ∈ V .
This is a contradiction to ∗u being a Pareto optimal state.
By Lemma A.5, ∃ (−∗˜ρh) ∈ N((Rh(∗χh)), ∗u), (∗ρi) ∈ N((Y i), ∗u), (∗ρj) ∈ N((Yj), ∗u), for
all h, i, and j, ψk ∈ N(Wk, ∗u), ψ˜ht=e,n ∈ N(W˜ ht , ∗u), ψit=e,n ∈ N(W it , ∗u), ∀h, and i; not
all equal to 0, such that
∑
h
(
∗˜
ρh) +
∑
i
(∗ρi) +
∑
j
(∗ρj) +
∑
k
ψk +
∑
h,t=e,n
ψ˜ht=e,n +
∑
i,t=e,n
ψit=e,n = 0. (5.6)
Working through element-by-element of the left-hand side of (5.6) and employing Lem-
mas A.2 and A.6, we ﬁnd that ∃λk ≥ 0 ∀k, λit=e,n ≥ 0, ∀i, and λ˜ht=e,n ≥ 0, ∀h such
that
( 1’)
∗˜
ρhk = λk, ∀k, and h
( 2’) ∗ρik = λk, ∀k, and i
( 3’) ∗ρjk = λk, ∀k, and j
( 4’)
∗˜
ρht=e,n = λ˜
h
t=e,n,
( 5’) ∗ρit=e,n = −λit=e,n, and
( 6’) ∗ρjt=e,n =
∑
h λ˜
h
t=e,n −
∑
i λ
i
t=e,n.
Conclusions of Lemma 2 follow.
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